From Aggressors to Allies: Germany and Japan Redefine Roles for the 21st Century
By Marshall Reid and Courtney Flynn Martino
For Germany and Japan, history weighs heavily. Eight decades removed from World War II, the conflict continues to cast a long shadow over the former Axis allies. Memories of militarism and the devastation it precipitated have left both countries with complex, uneasy relationships with their own military forces. While many of their neighbors have steadily expanded and enhanced their defensive capabilities, Berlin and Tokyo have long hesitated, prevented from following suit by post-war constitutional and legislative restrictions. But times and politics have changed. Pressure from external actors and shifting global leadership have prompted a re-examination in Germany and Japan of these restrictions, potentially setting a new course for both countries in the 21st century.
After decades of relative calm and continuity, the international order is in turmoil. Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine has brought full-scale war back to Europe, while China’s increasingly brazen saber-rattling toward Taiwan has raised fears of potentially catastrophic escalation. This uncertainty has been further compounded by the United States’ steady withdrawal from the system it once upheld. For both Germany and Japan, simply staying the course no longer seems tenable. Accordingly, the two have embarked on parallel efforts to remove or reform institutional limits on their armed forces and gathering of domestic intelligence. With these tangible legislative changes comes also a symbolic shedding of post-1945 norms and the acknowledgement of a new global landscape.
Legacies of the Past
Germany’s Basic Law was drafted in 1948 at the behest of the Allied forces administering the Federal Republic (BRD), or West Germany. It entered into effect the following year, and though initially conceived as a provisional measure for the BRD, the Basic Law has become a permanent cornerstone of the modern German state. The Basic Law outlines strict restrictions on military force, most notably in Article 35, which states that the armed forces and Federal Border Police may operate domestically only if one of Germany’s 16 federal states calls for assistance to respond to a “grave accident or a natural disaster.” Federal forces must be removed as soon as the “danger” has subsided, or at any time the Bundesrat, Germany’s upper house of Parliament, demands.
This restriction on the ability of German federal forces to maneuver against its own people was well-founded in 1949. But it has created a series of challenges in the present day. Russia’s war in Ukraine and Germany’s leading support for Ukraine has made Germany a target of alleged Russian drone surveillance. Although the German military is capable of shooting down the drones, they are prohibited from doing so under Article 35. Instead, it has become the responsibility of Germany’s civilian police, which says it lacks the training and equipment. Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt sought to close these gaps in late 2025 by establishing a federal counter-drone unit to train local police, but that was an administrative patch on a legislative problem. The real change came in February 2026, when the Aviation Security Act was amended by the Bundestag to allow federal forces to shoot down drones that enter German airspace.
Germany also has significant restrictions on its ability to conduct domestic surveillance, as both a consequence of the Nazi regime and the actions of the Stasi, the East German secret police. The Federal Intelligence Service (BND), founded in 1956, was given a narrow mandate to collect and analyze intelligence, but not to act on threats. The BND is under the direct purview of the executive branch to separate it from domestic law enforcement, another post-war stricture to protect the German people from state apparatuses. But in 2026, this leaves Germany at the mercy of its allies for advanced intelligence sharing and threat mitigation, namely the United States. The U.S. decision to temporarily halt exchanging intelligence with Ukraine in March 2025 sent shockwaves through Germany, prompting a closer look at its own intelligence dependencies.
In response, Chancellor Friedrich Merz has decided to try to expand the mandate of the BND to allow for more comprehensive surveillance of foreign targets inside Germany, as well as the ability to act on credible threats in the country by cyber or conventional means. To do this will require an exception to obligations under Germany’s stringent data privacy laws, which the Merz government has also put on the table. The government will introduce a series of proposals to the Bundestag later this year to codify these changes as a “special intelligence situation,” but the BND’s budget has already been increased by 26% for 2026 in a clear sign of what’s to come.
Japan’s political system also was redefined in the aftermath of World War II. Japan’s Constitution, ratified in 1946, was drafted primarily by U.S. civilian officials overseeing the occupation of Japan. While similar in many ways to the constitutions of other constitutional monarchies, the document contains a unique and highly influential element: Article 9. This section, a key demand of the allied occupiers, formally renounces Japan’s ability to wage war and restricts it from maintaining a standing military. Despite these limitations, successive Japanese governments have taken steps to enhance the capabilities of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), Japan’s de facto military, often by “reinterpreting” the meaning of Article 9.
In the wake of Prime Minster Sanae Takaichi’s historic victory in Japan’s February elections, however, such creativity may no longer be necessary. Takaichi’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its coalition partner now control over three-quarters of the seats in the House of Representatives, Japan’s lower house. Armed with a massive majority, Takaichi has said that she will begin the process of revising the Constitution “as soon as possible.” While considerable hurdles remain – constitutional revisions also require a vote in the upper house and a national referendum – the days of strict Japanese pacifism seem to be coming to an end.
Why Now?
Germany’s moniker as the “reluctant hegemon” has long been accurate, particularly on matters of defense and security. In many ways, Germany has also become a pacifist country, hesitant to engage in military activity unless it is under a joint UN or NATO banner. Before the suspension of Germany’s mandatory national service in 2011, 73% of young men chose to complete a longer civil service assignment, rather than spend a year in the armed forces. Thus, any internal momentum to expand security capabilities is strictly the result of external pressure from Russia’s war in Ukraine, which has forced Germany into a leading role in Europe. This turning point, defined by former Chancellor Olaf Scholz as a Zeitenwende, or watershed moment, is less about military might and more a means in the existential fight to maintain freedom on the European continent. Germany has repeatedly said they will not put troops on the ground in Ukraine, but Russia has brought the fight to them with increased cyber-attacks on German infrastructure and drone surveillance in German airspace. The ability to counter threats and project strength is crucial not only to Germany’s safety, but also to that of its neighbors as it becomes the pillar bolstering European support for Ukraine.
Like Germany, Japan is deeply concerned about the stability of its neighborhood. From the Korean Peninsula in the northwest to the Taiwan Strait in the southwest, Japan faces volatile security dilemmas on multiple fronts. China’s increasingly bellicose approach to Taiwan is particularly concerning for Tokyo. In November, the newly inaugurated Takaichi touched off a diplomatic crisis when she said that an attack on Taiwan would be an “existential crisis for Japan.” The firestorm that ensued contributed to the prime minister’s soaring popularity and provided further fuel for critics of Article 9.
In both Europe and East Asia, fears of instability have been intensified by drastic changes in U.S. foreign policy. Long a significant contributor to global security, the U.S. has become far less involved under the second Trump administration. Instead, Washington has pushed its allies to invest in their own security. For both Germany and Japan, this shift has served as further impetus for removing restrictions on their own military activity. Deprived of the U.S. security umbrella, the two are facing a very different world order, potentially necessitating a very different approach to security.
Looking Back While Moving Forward
While these efforts to remove institutional impediments will likely be welcomed by some, it is difficult to look to the future without engaging with the past. Both Germany and Japan have spent decades reckoning with the consequences of historic militarism, albeit in starkly divergent ways.
Germany is deeply aware of its responsibility to the global order following the horrors of National Socialism. The current shedding of postwar taboos is not taken lightly, and remains bound to a strong system of checks and balances. It also means that any steps taken by Germany to loosen these constraints are framed as being in the collective European good. In expanding the BND’s mandate, Merz couched these aspirations as actually being part of Germany’s obligation to its allies, “given the responsibility we bear in Europe in view of our size and economic strength...”
For Japan, the process of addressing past atrocities has proven considerably more uneven. Though Japanese leaders have issued numerous formal apologies, controversial statements and policy decisions have historically undermined their effectiveness in the eyes of many. For her part, Takaichi has said that Japanese war crimes have been “exaggerated”, an increasingly prevalent sentiment among nationalist politicians.
Both Chancellor Merz and Prime Minister Takaichi are navigating their countries through a historic rupture in the post-1945 order, where they are now seen as leaders in their respective regions. To adequately respond to current threats, they must take bold steps to lessen constraints put upon them by the very allies they now seek to safeguard. Codifying these changes into law represents not just legal justification, but a symbolic shedding of 20th century norms around the core identity of these countries. The shift of Germany and Japan from aggressor to ally has been accelerated by the aggression of others, but the characterization rings no less true. This clearly does not exonerate either country for atrocities committed; rather, this history carries with it a constant obligation to utilize their respective strengths for the common good and preservation of democratic freedoms.